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Abstract
In this paper, we study a time-inconsistent stochastic optimal control problem with a recursive cost
functional by a multi-person hierarchical differential game approach. An equilibrium strategy of this prob-
lem is constructed and a corresponding equilibrium Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB, for short) equation
is established to characterize the associated equilibrium value function. Moreover, a well-posedness result
of the equilibrium HJB equation is established under certain conditions.
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1 Introduction
Let (Ω,F ,F,P) be a complete filtered probability space on which a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion
W (·) is defined, whose natural filtration is F = {Ft}t>0 (augmented by all the P-null sets). Let T > 0. We
denote
D =
{
(t, ξ)
∣∣ t ∈ [0, T ], and ξ is Ft-measurable, Rn-valued, with E|ξ|2 <∞}.
For any (t, ξ) ∈ D , we consider the following controlled stochastic differential equation (SDE, for short):
(1.1)

 dX(s) = b(s,X(s), u(s))ds+ σ(s,X(s), u(s))dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],X(t) = ξ,
where b : [0, T ]×Rn×U → Rn and σ : [0, T ]×Rn×U → Rn×d are suitable deterministic maps with U ⊆ Rm
being a nonempty set, which could be bounded or unbounded. In the above, (t, ξ) ∈ D is called an initial
pair, u : [t, T ] × Ω → U is called a control process, and X : [t, T ] × Ω → Rn is called a state process. We
define the set of all admissible control processes by the following
U [t, T ] =
{
u : [t, T ]× Ω→ U
∣∣ u(·) is F-progressively measurable, with E∫ T
t
|u(s)|2ds <∞
}
.
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Under some mild conditions, for any (t, ξ) ∈ D and u(·) ∈ U [t, T ], (1.1) admits a unique strong solution
X(·) ≡ X(· ; t, ξ, u(·)). To measure the performance of the control process u(·) ∈ U [t, T ], we may introduce
the following cost functional
(1.2) J0(t, ξ;u(·)) = Et
[
e−λ(T−t)h0(X(T )) +
∫ T
t
e−λ(s−t)g0(s,X(s), u(s))ds
]
,
with some constant λ > 0 (called a discount rate), some maps g0 : [0, T ]× Rn × U → R and h0 : Rn → R,
and Et[ · ] = E[ · |Ft]. On the right hand side of (1.2), the first term is referred to as a discounted terminal
cost, and the second term is referred to as a discounted running cost. We note that discount terms e−λ(T−t)
and e−λ(s−t) appearing in the terminal cost and running cost are exponential functions which have the same
parameter λ. We therefore call (1.2) a cost functional with an exponential discount. Now, let us state the
following classical optimal control problem.
Problem (C)0. For any (t, ξ) ∈ D , find a u¯(·) ∈ U [t, T ] such that
(1.3) J0(t, ξ; u¯(·)) = essinf
u(·)∈U [t,T ]
J0(t, ξ;u(·)).
If an admissible control u¯(·) satisfies (1.3), it is called an optimal control for Problem (C)0 with the initial
pair (t, ξ). The corresponding state process X¯(·) and (X¯(·), u¯(·)) are called an optimal state and an optimal
pair. A function V : [0, T ]× Rn → R is called a value function of Problem (C)0 if
(1.4) V (t, x) = J(t, x; u¯(t)), P -a.s. , ∀ (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.
For the above problem, it is standard that (see, for example, [22]) if u¯(·) is an optimal control for the
initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ D with the corresponding optimal state process X¯(·), then for any s ∈ [t, T ],
J0(s, X¯(s); u¯(·)|[s,T ]) = essinf
u(·)∈U [s,T ]
J0(s, X¯(s);u(·)).
This means that the restriction u¯(·)|[s,T ] of u¯(·) on [s, T ] is an optimal control for the corresponding initial
pair (s, X¯(s)). Such a property is referred to as the time-consistency of the optimal control u¯(·), or the
time-consistency of Problem (C)0.
If we let (Y0(·), Z0(·)) ≡ (Y0(· ; t, ξ, u(·)), Z0(· ; t, ξ, u(·))) be the adapted solution to the following (linear)
backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE, for short):
(1.5)

 dY0(s) = −
[
λY0(s) + g
0(s,X(s), u(s))
]
ds+ Z0(s)dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
Y0(T ) = h
0(X(T )),
then the following holds:
Y0(t) = Et
[
e−λ(T−t)h0(X(T )) +
∫ T
t
e−λ(s−t)g0(s,X(s), u(s))ds
]
= J0(t, ξ;u(·)).
Therefore, Y0(t) ≡ Y0(t; t, ξ, u(·)) is a representation of J
0(t, ξ, u(·)). Further, from BSDE (1.5), we also have
Y0(t) = Et
[
h0(X(T )) +
∫ T
t
(
λY0(s) + g
0(s,X(s), u(s))
)
ds
]
.
This reminds us the stochastic differential utility (SDU, for short) introduced by Duffie and Epstein in 1992
([4, 5], see also [6]), which is the continuous-time version of recursive utility ([11]). More precisely, for a
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terminal random payoff η (at time T ) and a consumption process c(·) on [t, T ] (which can be regarded as a
control process), a corresponding SDU process Y (·) is a solution to the following equation:
(1.6) Y (s) = Es
[
η +
∫ T
s
g(r, c(r), Y (r))dr
]
, s ∈ [t, T ],
for some proper map g(·). It is by now well-understood that under some mild conditions, the following
(possibly non-linear) BSDE admits a unique adapted solution (Y (·), Z(·)):
 dY (s) = −g(s, c(s), Y (s))ds+ Z(s)dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],Y (T ) = η,
and the process Y (·) satisfies (1.6). In another word, a general SDU process can be represented by the adapted
solution to a proper BSDE. Because of this, the SDU of Duffie-Epstein has been extended substantially later
([8, 1, 13, 12]). Hereafter, we call the adapted solution (Y (·), Z(·)) of a BSDE an SDU process.
Inspired by the SDUs, for control system (1.1), we may introduce the following cost functional:
(1.7) J(t, ξ;u(·)) = Y (t; t, ξ, u(·)),
with (Y (·), Z(·)) ≡ (Y (· ; t, ξ, u(·)), Z(· ; t, ξ, u(·))) being the adapted solution to the following BSDE:
(1.8)

 dY (s) = −g(s,X(s), u(s), Y (s), Z(s))ds+ Z(s)dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],Y (T ) = h(X(T )),
for which (1.5) is a special case.
Based on the above, we rewrite (1.1) and (1.8) in a compact form:
(1.9)


dX(s) = b(s,X(s), u(s))ds+ σ(s,X(s), u(s))dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
dY (s) = −g(s,X(s), u(s), Y (s), Z(s))ds+ Z(s)dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
X(t) = ξ, Y (T ) = h(X(T )),
which is a controlled decoupled forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE, for short, see [15]
for some relevant results), and consider the cost functional defined by (1.7). With these, we may formally
pose the following optimal control problem involving SDU:
Problem (C). For any (t, ξ) ∈ D , find a u¯(·) ∈ U [t, T ] such that
J(t, ξ; u¯(·)) = essinf
u(·)∈U [t,T ]
J(t, ξ;u(·)).
Similar to Problem (C)0, one can show that Problem (C) is also time-consistent ([20]).
Although time-consistency is a very good feature of Problems (C)0 and (C), it is a little too ideal. In
real world, time-consistent situation rarely exists. Instead, most problems, if not all, people encounter are
not time-consistent. In another word, an optimal policy/control found for the current initial pair (t, ξ) will
hardly stay optimal as time goes by. We refer to such kind of situations the time-inconsistency. Some careful
observations show that one important reason leading to time-inconsistency is due to people’s subjective time-
preferences. As a matter of fact, people usually discount more on the utility for the outcome of immediate
future events. Mathematically, such a situation can be described by the so-called non-exponential discounting,
meaning that the discounting terms e−λ(T−t) and e−λ(s−t) appear in the terminal cost and the running cost
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are replaced by some more general functions µ(T, t) and ν(s, t), respectively. We note that even if these
functions are respectively replaced by exponential functions e−λ1(T−t) and e−λ2(s−t), as long as λ1 6= λ2, the
corresponding problem will already become time-inconsistent ([16, 17]). As suggested in [22, 23, 24, 25, 26],
instead of (1.2), one may consider cost functional
(1.10) J(t, ξ;u(·)) = Et
[
h(t,X(T )) +
∫ T
t
g(t, s,X(s), u(s))ds
]
.
It is clear that the classical situation (1.2) corresponds to the following special case:
h(t, x) = e−λ(T−t)h0(x), g(t, s, x, u) = e−λ(s−t)g0(s, x, u).
However, we see easily that the above (1.10) does not contain the problems involving SDUs. In order to
include problems involving SDUs, we now propose the following:
(1.11)

 dY (s) = −g(t, s,X(s), u(s), Y (s), Z(s))ds + Z(s)dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],Y (T ) = h(t,X(T )),
then we may let the cost functional to be
(1.12) J(t, ξ;u(·)) = Y (t; t, ξ, u(·)) = Et
[
h(t,X(T )) +
∫ T
t
g(t, s,X(s), u(s), Y (s), Z(s))ds
]
.
Let us make a couple of observations. Firstly, if
g(t, s, x, u, y, z) ≡ g(t, s, x, u),
then (1.12) is reduced to (1.10), and (1.11) is not necessary. Secondly, if
h(t, x) ≡ h(x), g(t, s, x, u, y, z) ≡ g(s, x, u, y, z),
then (1.11) is reduced to (1.8) and (1.12) coincides with (1.7), so that the corresponding optimal control
problem becomes Problem (C).
Suggested by the above, we may now introduce the following controlled decoupled FBSDE:
(1.13)


dX(s) = b(s,X(s), u(s))ds+ σ(s,X(s), u(s))dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
dY (s) = −g(t, s,X(s), u(s), Y (s), Z(s))ds + Z(s)dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
X(t) = ξ, Y (T ) = h(t,X(T )).
Under some mild conditions, for any (t, ξ) ∈ D and u(·) ∈ U [t, T ], the above FBSDE admits a unique
adapted solution (X(·), Y (·), Z(·)) ([15]). Then we may define the recursive cost functional by
(1.14) J(t, ξ;u(·)) = Y (t) ≡ Y (t; t, ξ, u(·)),
and an optimal control problem can be posed. It is expected that such an optimal control problem is time-
inconsistent. Therefore, finding an optimal control at any given initial pair (t, ξ) is not very useful. Instead,
one should wisely find an equilibrium strategy which is time consistent and possesses certain kind of local
optimality.
To find time-consistent equilibrium strategy, we adopt the method of multi-person differential game.
The idea can be at least traced back to the work of Pollak [21] in 1968. Later, the approach was adopted
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and further developed by Ekeland–lazrak [7], Yong [24, 26, 27], Bjo¨rk–Murgoci [2], and Bjo¨rk–Murgoci–
Zhou [3] for various kinds of problems. Let us now elaborate the approach a little more carefully to our
stochastic recursive cost case as follows, which has some substantial and interesting differences from the
works mentioned above.
Firstly, we divide the whole time interval [0, T ] into N subintervals: [t0, t1), [t1, t2), · · · , [tN−1, tN ], with
t0 = 0, tN = T , and introduce an N -person differential game, where players are labeled from 1 through N .
Player k takes over the system at time tk−1 from Player (k − 1), and controls the system on [tk−1, tk), then
hand it over to Player (k + 1) at tk. The “sophisticated” recursive cost functional for Player k is defined
through a BSDE on [tk−1, tk], whose coefficient/generator depends on his/her initial pair (tk−1, X
k(tk−1))
with Xk(tk−1) equal to X
k−1(tk−1) (the terminal state of Player (k − 1)) and whose terminal value at tk
equals Θk(tk, X
k(tk)) with X
k(tk) being the terminal state of Player k. The function Θ
k(· , ·) is constructed
based on the assumption that later players will play optimally with respect to their “sophisticated” recursive
cost functionals. Therefore, the “sophisticated” recursive cost functionals are constructed recursively. On the
other hand, although he/she will not control the system on [tk, T ], Player k will still “discounts” the future
costs in his/her own way, due to the time-preference feature of the problem [24, 26, 27]. It turns out that
each player faces a resulted time-consistent optimal control problem. Therefore, under suitable conditions,
each player will have an optimal control defined on the corresponding subinterval. Then we could construct
a partition-dependent equilibrium strategy and the corresponding partition-dependent equilibrium value
function of the game.
Secondly, letting the mesh size of the partition tend to zero, we (at least formally could) get the limits
called the time-consistent equilibrium strategy and time-consistent equilibrium value function of the original
time-inconsistent optimal control problem. At the same time, a so-called equilibrium Hamilton–Jacobi–
Bellman equation (equilibrium HJB equation, for short) is also derived to characterize the time-consistent
equilibrium value function. Moreover, in the case that the equilibrium HJB equation is well-posed, the
formal convergence (as the mesh size goes to zero) of the relevant functions will become rigorous.
Finally, at the moment, to establish the well-posedness of the equilibrium HJB equation, we will assume
that the diffusion term σ of the state equation does not depend on the control process u(·), beside some
other mild conditions. The general case that σ contains the control process u(·) is still open and will be
investigated in the future.
By the way, as we mentioned, the optimal control problem for every player (with the “sophisticated”
recursive cost functional) is time-consistent. Thus, it is expected that one could use the classical approach
to deal with them. To this end, we establish a stochastic verification theorem. To our best knowledge, there
is no existing ready-to-use result which can be applied to our problem directly.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the preliminaries for our study. We
recall the relationship between FBSDEs and PDEs, and establish a verification theorem for time-consistent
optimal control problem with recursive cost functional. In Section 3, the time-inconsistent recursive stochas-
tic optimal control problem is formulated. Then we introduce and solve the multi-person differential game
in Section 4, which leads to an approximate time-consistent equilibrium strategy for the original problem.
By letting the mesh size of the partition go to zero, we also formally obtain an equilibrium strategy and a
characterization of the equilibrium value function in terms of the equilibrium HJB equation. Finally, the
well-posedness of the equilibrium HJB equation is established under proper conditions.
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2 Preliminaries
We introduce the following notation:
D[0, T ] =
{
(t, s) ∈ [0, T ]2
∣∣ 0 6 t 6 s 6 T}.
Let U ⊆ Rm be a nonempty set, which could be bounded or unbounded. Let maps b : [0, T ]×Rn×U → Rn,
σ : [0, T ] × Rn × U → Rn×d, g : D[0, T ] × Rn × U × R × R1×d → R, and h : [0, T ] × Rn → R satisfy the
following assumptions.
(H1) Maps b, σ, g and h are continuous and there exists a constant L > 0 such that, for any (t, s, u) ∈
D[0, T ]× U , any u1, u2 ∈ U , x1, x2 ∈ R
n, y1, y2 ∈ R, z1, z2 ∈ R
1×d,
|b(s, x1, u)− b(s, x2, u)|+ |σ(s, x1, u)− σ(s, x2, u)|
+|g(t, s, x1, u, y1, z1)− g(t, s, x2, u, y2, z2)|+ |h(t, x1)− h(t, x2)|
6 L(|x1 − x2|+ |y1 − y2|+ |z1 − z2|),
and
|b(s, 0, u)|+ |σ(s, 0, u)|+ |g(t, s, 0, u, 0, 0)| 6 L(1 + |u|).
The following standard result shows that FBSDE (1.13) is well-posed.
Proposition 2.1. Let (H1) hold. Then for any (t, ξ) ∈ D and u(·) ∈ U [t, T ], FBSDE (1.13) admits a
unique adapted solution (X(·), Y (·), Z(·)) ≡ (X(· ; t, ξ, u(·)), Y (· ; t, ξ, u(·)), Z(· ; t, ξ, u(·))) such that
Et
[
sup
t6s6T
|X(s)|2 + sup
t6s6T
|Y (s)|2 +
∫ T
t
|Z(s)|2ds
]
6 K
{
1 + |ξ|2 + Et
∫ T
t
|u(s)|2ds
}
.
Before going further, we introduce some notations. Let Sn ⊆ Rn×n be the set of all (n × n) symmetric
matrices. Let
(2.1)


a(t, x, u) =
1
2
σ(t, x, u)σ(t, x, u)⊤, (t, x, u) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × U,
H(τ, t, x, u, θ, p, P ) = tr
[
a(t, x, u)P
]
+
〈
b(t, x, u), p
〉
+ g
(
τ, t, x, u, θ, p⊤σ(t, x, u)
)
,
(τ, t, x, u, θ, p, P ) ∈ D[0, T ]× Rn × U × R× Rn × Sn,
where the superscript ⊤ denotes the transpose of vectors or matrices. We note that, since U is not necessarily
compact, inf
u∈U
H(τ, t, x, u, θ, p, P ) may be infinite on the whole space D[0, T ]×Rn×U ×R×Rn×Sn. Similar
to Yong [24], we introduce the following assumption.
(H2) There exists a map ψ : D[0, T ]× Rn × R× Rn × Sn → U with needed regularity such that
ψ(τ, t, x, θ, p, P ) ∈ argmin H(τ, t, x, · , θ, p, P )
≡
{
u¯ ∈ U
∣∣ H(τ, t, x, u¯, θ, p, P ) = min
u∈U
H(τ, t, x, u, θ, p, P )
}
,
(τ, t, x, θ, p, P ) ∈ D[0, T ]× Rn × R× Rn × Sn.
For more explanations and comments on the above Assumption (H2), one is referred to [24].
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2.1 FBSDEs and PDEs
As preparations, we begin with the following family of FBSDEs without involving controls, which are time-
consistent and parameterized by the initial pairs (t, ξ) ∈ D :
(2.2)


dX(s) = b(s,X(s))ds+ σ(s,X(s))dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
dY (s) = −g(s,X(s), Y (s), Z(s))ds+ Z(s)dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
X(t) = ξ, Y (T ) = h(X(T )).
Note that, under Assumption (H1) (ignoring t and u), by Proposition 2.1, (2.2) admits a unique adapted
solution (X(·), Y (·), Z(·)) ≡ (X(· ; t, ξ), Y (· ; t, ξ), Z(· ; t, ξ)). We point out that Assumption (H1) can be
substantially relaxed still guaranteeing the existence and uniqueness of the adapted solution to FBSDE
(2.2). As suggested in [19, 18, 14], the family of FBSDEs (2.2) is closely linked to the following semi-linear
partial differential equation (PDE, for short):
(2.3)

Θt(t, x) +H
(
t, x,Θ(t, x),Θx(t, x),Θxx(t, x)
)
= 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
Θ(T, x) = h(x), x ∈ Rn,
where, for simplicity, we use the notation H defined in (2.1) omitting τ and u.
We denote
C1,2([0, T ]× Rn) =
{
v(· , ·) ∈ C([0, T ]× Rn)
∣∣ vt(·, ·), vx(·, ·), vxx(·, ·) ∈ C([0, T ]× Rn)}.
The following result will be used below.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose Θ(· , ·) ∈ C1,2([0, T ] × Rn) is a classical solution to PDE (2.3). For any given
(t, ξ) ∈ D , suppose FBSDE (2.2) admits a unique solution (X(·), Y (·), Z(·)) ≡ (X(· ; t, ξ), Y (· ; t, ξ), Z(· ; t, ξ)).
Then
Θ(t, ξ) = Y (t; t, ξ), a.s.
Proof. For any given initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ D , noting that X(·) is the solution to the forward equation in
(2.2), by applying Itoˆ’s formula to Θ(· , X(·)), we get
Θ(s,X(s)) = h(X(T ))−
∫ T
s
{
Θt(r,X(r)) + tr
[
a(r,X(r))Θxx(r,X(r))
]
+ 〈 b(r,X(r)),Θx(r,X(r)) 〉
}
dr
−
∫ T
t
Θx(r,X(r))
⊤σ(r,X(r))dW (r), s ∈ [t, T ].
By the definition of function H (see (2.1) ignoring τ and u), and noticing Θ(· , ·) satisfies PDE (2.3), the
above equation can be rewritten as
Θ(s,X(s)) = h(X(T ))−
∫ T
s
g
(
r,X(r),Θ(r,X(r)),Θx(r,X(r))
⊤σ(r,X(r))
)
dr
−
∫ T
s
Θx(r,X(r))
⊤σ(r,X(r))dW (r), s ∈ [t, T ].
By the uniqueness of the backward equation in (2.2), we have
Θ(s,X(s)) = Y (s; t, ξ), a.s. , ∀s ∈ [t, T ].
Consequently, by letting s = t, we obtain our conclusion.
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2.2 Problem (C) and verification theorem
In this subsection, we consider the controlled form of (2.2), i.e., for any initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ D , the controlled
FBSDE is given by
(2.4)


dX(s) = b(s,X(s), u(s))ds+ σ(s,X(s), u(s))dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
dY (s) = −g(s,X(s), u(s), Y (s), Z(s))ds+ Z(s)dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
X(t) = ξ, Y (T ) = h(X(T )).
For any initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ D and any control process u(·) ∈ U [t, T ], under Assumption (H1) ignoring t,
Proposition 2.1 works again to ensure the existence and uniqueness of solution to (2.4). As in Section 1, now
we introduce the following recursive cost functional
(2.5) J(t, ξ;u(·) = Y (t; t, ξ, u(·)), u(·) ∈ U [t, T ],
and present a result about Problem (C).
Comparing with PDE (2.3) which is related to the situation without involving control processes, the
family of controlled FBSDEs (2.4) are closely linked to the following so-called Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB, for short) equation which is a fully non-linear PDE:
(2.6)

Vt(t, x) + infu∈U H
(
t, x, u, V (t, x), Vx(t, x), Vxx(t, x)
)
= 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
V (T, x) = h(x), x ∈ Rn,
where, for simplicity, we use the notation H defined in (2.1) ignoring τ once again.
The following result is called a verification theorem for Problem (C) which can be regarded as a gener-
alization of Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 2.2. Let (H1) hold. Suppose V (· , ·) ∈ C1,2([0, T ]×Rn) is a classical solution to the HJB equation
(2.6). Then, for any (t, ξ) ∈ D ,
(2.7) V (t, ξ) 6 J(t, ξ;u(·)), a.s. , ∀ u(·) ∈ U [t, T ].
Moreover, let (X¯(·), u¯(·)) be a state-control pair with (t, ξ) such that
(2.8) u¯(s) ∈ argmin H(s, X¯(s), · , V (s, X¯(s)), Vx(s, X¯(s)), Vxx(s, X¯(s))), s ∈ [t, T ],
Then
(2.9) V (t, ξ) = J(t, ξ; u¯(·)), a.s.
In another word, V (· , ·) is the value function of Problem (C), and (X¯(·), u¯(·)) is an optimal pair of Problem
(C) for the initial pair (t, ξ).
Proof. For any (t, ξ) ∈ D , let (X(·), u(·)) be an admissible pair with (t, ξ). From the HJB equation (2.6),
(2.10) Vt(s,X(s)) +H
(
s,X(s), u(s), V (s,X(s)), Vx(s,X(s)), Vxx(s,X(s))
)
> 0, s ∈ [t, T ].
On the other hand, by applying Itoˆ’s formula to V (· , X(·)), we have
V (s,X(s)) = h(X(T ))−
∫ T
s
{
Vt(r,X(r)) + tr
[
a(r,X(r), u(r))Vxx(r,X(r))
]
+
〈
b(r,X(r), u(r)), Vx(r,X(r))
〉}
dr
−
∫ T
s
Vx(r,X(r))
⊤σ(r,X(r), u(r))dW (r), s ∈ [t, T ].
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By the definition of function H (see (2.1) ignoring τ), the above equation can be rewritten as
(2.11)
V (s,X(s)) = h(X(T )) +
∫ T
s
{
g
(
r,X(r), u(r), V (r,X(r)), Vx(r,X(r))
⊤σ(r,X(r), u(r))
)
−Vt(r,X(r)) −H
(
r,X(r), u(r), V (r,X(r)), Vx(r,X(r)), Vxx(r,X(r))
)}
dr
−
∫ T
s
Vx(r,X(r))
⊤σ(r,X(r), u(r))dW (r), s ∈ [t, T ].
Noticing (2.10), by the Comparison Theorem of BSDEs (see El Karoui–Peng–Quenez [8]), we obtain
V (s,X(s)) 6 Y (s; t, ξ, u(·)), a.s. , ∀ s ∈ [t, T ].
Particularly, by taking s = t, the above implies (2.7).
Next, if the admissible pair (X¯(·), u¯(·)) satisfies (2.8), then the equal sign in (2.10) holds, and (2.11)
becomes
V (s, X¯(s)) = h(X¯(T )) +
∫ T
s
g
(
r, X¯(r), u¯(r), V (r, X¯(r)), Vx(r, X¯(r))
⊤σ(r, X¯(r), u¯(r))
)
dr
−
∫ T
s
Vx(r, X¯(r))
⊤σ(r, X¯(r), u¯(r))dW (r) s ∈ [t, T ].
By the uniqueness of adapted solutions to BSDE, we have
V (s, X¯(s)) = Y (s; t, ξ, u¯(s)), a.s. , ∀ s ∈ [t, T ].
Letting s = t, we obtain (2.9) and the proof is completed.
3 Time-Inconsistent Problem and Equilibrium Strategy
In this section, we formulate the time-inconsistent recursive stochastic optimal control problem, and introduce
the notion of equilibrium strategy for the problem.
For convenience, let us rewrite the state equation (1.13) and the recursive cost functional (1.14) as follows:
(3.1)


dX(s) = b(s,X(s), u(s))ds+ σ(s,X(s), u(s))dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
dY (s) = −g(t, s,X(s), u(s), Y (s), Z(s))ds + Z(s)dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
X(t) = ξ, Y (T ) = h(t,X(T )),
(3.2) J(t, ξ;u(·)) = Y (t; t, ξ, u(·)), u(·) ∈ U [t, T ].
We pose the following problem.
Problem (N). For any (t, ξ) ∈ D , find a u¯(·) ∈ U [t, T ] such that
J(t, ξ; u¯(·)) = essinf
u(·)∈U [t,T ]
J(t, ξ;u(·)).
As mentioned in Section 1, Problem (N) is time-inconsistent. Therefore, instead of find an optimal
control for a given initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ D , we would like to find a time-consistent equilibrium strategy for
Problem (N) over the whole time interval [0, T ]. Our approach is inspired by that developed in [24], for a
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time-inconsistent optimal control problem of stochastic differential equations (SDE, for short), with Bolza
type cost functional (We now have a recursive cost functional).
Let P [0, T ] denote the set of all partitions Π = {tk | 0 6 k 6 N} of [0, T ] with 0 = t0 < t1 < t2 < · · · <
tN−1 < tN = T . The mesh size of Π is defined as ‖Π‖ = max
16k6N
(tk − tk−1). Similar to [24], we present the
definition of time-consistent equilibrium strategy of Problem (N) as follows.
Definition 3.1. A continuous map u : [0, T ]× Rn → U is called a time-consistent equilibrium strategy of
Problem (N) if the following hold:
(i) (Time-consistency) For any x ∈ Rn, the following closed-loop system:
(3.3)


dX¯(s) = b
(
s, X¯(s),u(s, X¯(s))
)
ds+ σ
(
s, X¯(s),u(s, X¯(s))
)
dW (s), s ∈ [0, T ],
dY¯ (t, s) = −g
(
t, s, X¯(s),u(s, X¯(s)), Y¯ (t, s), Z¯(t, s)
)
ds+ Z(t, s)dW (s), (t, s) ∈ D[0, T ],
X¯(0) = x, Y¯ (t, T ) = h
(
t, X¯(T )
)
, t ∈ [0, T ],
admits a unique adapted solution
(
X¯(·), Y¯ (· , ·), Z¯(· , ·)
)
≡
(
X¯(· ;x), Y¯ (· , · ;x), Z(· , · ;x)
)
.
(ii) (Local approximate optimality) There exists a family of partitions P0[0, T ] ⊆ P [0, T ] with
inf
Π∈P0[0,T ]
‖Π‖ = 0,
and a family of maps uΠ : [0, T ]× Rn → U parameterized by the partitions Π ∈ P0[0, T ] such that
lim
‖Π‖→0
sup
(t,x)∈K
|uΠ(t, x)− u(t, x)| = 0, ∀ compact set K ⊆ [0, T ]× Rn,
with uΠ being locally optimal in the following sense: Let Π = {tk | 0 6 k 6 N} ∈ P0[0, T ]. For any x ∈ R
n,
the following FBSDE:

dXΠ(s) = b
(
s,XΠ(s),uΠ(s,XΠ(s))
)
ds+ σ
(
s,XΠ(s),uΠ(s,XΠ(s))
)
dW (s), s ∈ [0, T ],
dY Π(tk, s) = −g
(
tk, s,X
Π(s),uΠ(s,XΠ(s)), Y Π(tk, s), Z
Π(tk, s)
)
ds+ ZΠ(tk, s)dW (s),
s ∈ [tk, T ], 0 6 k 6 N − 1,
XΠ(0) = x, Y Π(tk, T ) = h
(
tk, X
Π(T )
)
, 0 6 k 6 N − 1
admits a unique adapted solution:
(XΠ(·), Y Π(tk, ·), Z
Π(tk, ·)) ≡ (X
Π(· ;x,uΠ(·)), Y Π(tk, · ;x,u
Π(·)), ZΠ(tk, · ;x,u
Π(·))),
such that for each k = 1, 2, · · · , N ,
(3.4)
J
(
tk−1, X
Π(tk−1);u
Π(· ;XΠ(·))|[tk−1,T ]
)
= Y Π(tk−1, tk−1)
6 J
(
tk−1, X
Π(tk−1);u
k(·)⊕ uΠ(· ;Xk(·))|[tk ,T ]
)
= Y k(tk−1), ∀ u
k(·) ∈ U [tk−1, tk],
where
(3.5)
[
uk(·)⊕ uΠ(· ;Xk(·))|[tk,T ]
]
(s) =

 u
k(s), s ∈ [tk−1, tk),
u
Π
(
s,Xk(s)
)
, s ∈ [tk, T ],
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and (Xk(·), Y k(·), Zk(·)) is the unique adapted solution to the following FBSDE defined on the interval
[tk−1, T ]:

dXk(s) = b
(
s,Xk(s), uk(s)
)
ds+ σ
(
s,Xk(s), uk(s)
)
dW (s), s ∈ [tk−1, tk),
dXk(s) = b
(
s,Xk(s),uΠ(s,Xk(s))
)
ds+ σ
(
s,Xk(s),uΠ(s,Xk(s))
)
dW (s), s ∈ [tk, T ],
dY k(s) = −g
(
tk−1, s,X
k(s), uk(s), Y k(s), Zk(s)
)
ds+ Zk(s)dW (s), s ∈ [tk−1, tk),
dY k(s) = −g
(
tk−1, s,X
k(s),uΠ(s,Xk(s)), Y k(s), Zk(s)
)
ds+ Zk(s)dW (s), s ∈ [tk, T ],
Xk(tk−1) = X
Π(tk−1), Y
k(T ) = h
(
tk−1, X
k(T )
)
.
Moreover, for any (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
(3.6) lim
‖Π‖→0
(
|XΠ(s)− X¯(s)|+ |Y Π(ℓΠ(s), ℓΠ(s))− Y¯ (s, s)|
)
= 0, a.s. ,
where
(3.7) ℓΠ(s) =
N∑
k=1
tk−11[tk−1,tk)(s), s ∈ [0, T ].
In the above, X¯(·) is called a time-consistent equilibrium state process, u¯(·) ≡ u(· , X¯(·)) is called a time-
consistent equilibrium control for the initial state x, and (X¯(·), u¯(·)) is called a time-consistent equilibrium
pair of Problem (N). It is easy to see that the convergence (3.6) implies
lim
‖Π‖→0
J
(
ℓΠ(t), XΠ(ℓΠ(t));uΠ(· , XΠ(·))|[ℓΠ(t),T ]
)
= J
(
t, X¯(t),u(· , X¯(·))|[t,T ]
)
, a.s.
We call V : [0, T ]× Rn → Rn an equilibrium value function of Problem (N) if
(3.8) V
(
t, X¯(t)
)
= J
(
t, X¯(t),u(· , X¯(·))|[t,T ]
)
, a.s. , (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.
We also call uΠ(· , ·) an approximate equilibrium strategy of Problem (N) associated with the partition Π.
Let us make a couple of comments on the above long-looking definition.
• The state equation (3.3) admits a unique solution under u(· , ·) means that as a strategy, u(· , ·) is
time-consistent. It is interesting to know that such a strategy is of closed-loop nature, in the sense that it is
independent of the initial state.
• Condition (3.4) means that the outcome uΠ(· ;XΠ(·)) of the strategy uΠ(· , ·) is locally optimal in a
proper sense. Due to the fact that the global optimal control is time-inconsistent, such kind of local optimal
control should be the best that one can obtain.
4 Multi-Person Differential Games
In this section, we shall construct a family uΠ(· , ·) of approximate equilibrium strategies which plays the
role as in Definition 3.1. To this end, we consider a family of multi-person differential games, called Problem
(GΠ), associated with the partition Π : 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tN−1 < tN = T . In the game, there are N
players labeled from 1 to N . Player k controls the system on the interval [tk−1, tk) by selecting his/her own
admissible control uk(·) ∈ U [tk−1, tk]. We now carry out the details below.
11
4.1 Player N — a classical optimal control problem
In what follows, we denote
L2Ft(Ω;R
n) =
{
ξ : Ω→ Rn
∣∣ ξ is Ft-measurable, E|ξ|2 <∞}, t ∈ [0, T ].
Let us start with Player N who controls the system on [tN−1, tN ], the last time interval of the partition
Π. For any admissible control uN (·) ∈ U [tN−1, tN ] and initial state ξN−1 ∈ L
2
FtN−1
(Ω;Rn), the controlled
FBSDE for Player N reads
(4.1)


dXN(s) = b
(
s,XN(s), uN (s)
)
ds+ σ
(
s,XN (s), uN(s)
)
dW (s), s ∈ [tN−1, tN ],
dY N (s) = −g
(
tN−1, s,X
N(s), uN (s), Y N (s), ZN (s)
)
ds+ ZN (s)dW (s), s ∈ [tN−1, tN ],
XN(tN−1) = ξN−1, Y
N (tN ) = h
(
tN−1, X
N(tN )
)
,
whose unique adapted solution is denoted by
(XN(·), Y N (·), ZN (·)) ≡
(
XN(· ; ξN−1, u
N(·)), Y N (· ; ξN−1, u
N(·)), ZN (· ; ξN−1, u
N(·))
)
,
emphasizing the dependence on (ξN−1, u
N(·)). The recursive cost functional is given by
(4.2)
J(tN−1, ξN−1;u
N(·)) = Y N (tN−1; ξN−1, u
N(·))
= EtN−1
[ ∫ T
tN−1
g(tN−1, s,X
N(s), uN (s), Y N (s), ZN (s))ds+ h(tN−1, X
N(T ))
]
.
The optimal control problem for Player N can be stated as follows.
Problem (CN). For any ξN−1 ∈ L
2
FtN−1
(Ω;Rn), find a u¯N(·) ∈ U [tN−1, tN ] such that
J(tN−1, ξN−1; u¯
N (·)) = essinf
uN (·)∈U [tN−1,tN ]
J(tN−1, ξN−1;u
N(·)).
Problem (CN ) is a standard stochastic optimal control problem with recursive cost functional, which can
be solved by the stochastic verification theorem (see Theorem 2.2). More precisely, under proper conditions,
the following HJB equation admits a classical solution V Π(· , ·):
(4.3)

V
Π
t (t, x) + inf
u∈U
H
(
tN−1, t, x, u, V
Π(t, x), V Πx (t, x), V
Π
xx(t, x)
)
= 0, (t, x) ∈ [tN−1, tN ]× R
n,
V Π(tN , x) = h(tN−1, x),
where H is defined by (2.1). Recalling the map ψ introduced in (H2), we define
(4.4) uΠ(t, x) = ψ
(
tN−1, t, x, V
Π(t, x), V Πx (t, x), V
Π
xx(t, x)
)
, (t, x) ∈ [tN−1, tN ]× R
n.
Let us assume that for ξN−1 ∈ L
2
FtN−1
(Ω;Rn), the following FBSDE (which is a closed-loop system):
(4.5)


dX¯N (s) = b
(
s, X¯N(s),uΠ(s, X¯N(s))
)
ds+ σ
(
s, X¯N(s),uΠ(s, X¯N(s))
)
dW (s), s ∈ [tN−1, tN ],
dY¯ N (s) = −g
(
tN−1, s, X¯
N(s),uΠ(s, X¯N(s)), Y¯ N (s), Z¯N (s)
)
ds+ Z¯N (s)dW (s), s ∈ [tN−1, tN ],
X¯N (tN−1) = ξN−1, Y¯
N (tN ) = h
(
tN−1, X¯
N(tN )
)
admits a unique adapted solution(
X¯N (·), Y¯ N (·), Z¯N (·)
)
≡
(
X¯N (· ; ξN−1), Y¯
N (· ; ξN−1), Z¯
N (· ; ξN−1)
)
.
Then by Theorem 2.2, (X¯N(· ; ξN−1),u
Π(· , X¯N(· ; ξN−1))) is an optimal pair of Problem (CN ) for the initial
pair (tN−1, ξN−1). Because of that, u
Π(· , ·) defined by (4.4) (on [tN−1, tN ]×R
n) is called an optimal strategy
of Player N , and uΠ(· , X¯N(·)) is called an outcome of uΠ(· , ·).
12
4.2 Player (N − 1) — a sophisticated optimal control problem
We now look at Player (N − 1) who takes over the system from Player (N − 2), controls the system on
[tN−2, tN−1) and hand it over to Player N at tN−1. Player (N − 1) knows that Player N will play optimally
through the optimal strategy uΠ(· , ·) (which is already defined on [tN−1, tN ] × R
n). Due to the subjective
time-preference, Player (N − 1) still “discounts” the future costs in his/her own way despite he/she will not
control the system beyond tN−1. According to this viewpoint, the controlled FBSDE of Player (N − 1) is
given by
(4.6)


dXN−1(s) = b
(
s,XN−1(s), uN−1(s)
)
ds+ σ
(
s,XN−1(s), uN−1(s)
)
dW (s), s ∈ [tN−2, tN−1),
dXN−1(s) = b
(
s,XN−1(s),uΠ(s,XN−1(s))
)
ds+ σ
(
s,XN−1(s),uΠ(s,XN−1(s))
)
dW (s),
s ∈ [tN−1, tN ],
dY N−1(s) = −g
(
tN−2, s,X
N−1(s), uN−1(s), Y N−1(s), ZN−1(s)
)
ds+ ZN−1(s)dW (s),
s ∈ [tN−2, tN−1),
dY N−1(s) = −g
(
tN−2, s,X
N−1(s),uΠ(s,XN−1(s)), Y N−1(s), ZN−1(s)
)
ds+ ZN−1(s)dW (s),
s ∈ [tN−1, tN ],
XN−1(tN−2) = ξN−2, Y
N−1(tN ) = h
(
tN−2, X
N−1(tN )
)
,
where ξN−2 ∈ L
2
FtN−2
(Ω;Rn) and uN−1(·) ∈ U [tN−2, tN−1]. Let
(XN−1(·), Y N−1(·), ZN−1(·))
≡
(
XN−1(· ; ξN−2, u
N−1(·)), Y N−1(· ; ξN−2, u
N−1(·)), ZN−1(· ; ξN−2, u
N−1(·))
)
be the adapted solution of (4.6), depending on the initial state ξN−2 ∈ L
2
FtN−2
(Ω;Rn) and the control
uN−1(·) ∈ U [tN−2, tN−1]. Then we define the sophisticated recursive cost functional of Player (N − 1) by
the following:
(4.7) J˜(tN−2, ξN−2;u
N−1(·)) ≡ J(tN−2, ξN−2;u
N−1(·)⊕ uΠ(· , XN−1(·))) = Y N−1(tN−2; ξN−2, u
N−1(·)).
where the operation “⊕” is defined by (3.5) and uΠ(· , ·) is defined by (4.4). Clearly, the above is different
from the “naive” recursive cost functional J(tN−2, ξN−2;u(·)) defined by (1.14). We emphasize that for
different control uN−1(·) selected from U [tN−2, tN−1], X
N−1(tN−1) ≡ X
N−1(tN−1; tN−2, ξN−2, u
N−1(·))
will be different, which will result in the FBSDE on [tN−1, tN ] having a different initial condition forX
N−1(·).
Now we pose the following problem for Player (N − 1).
Problem (CN−1). For any ξN−2 ∈ L
2
FtN−2
(Ω;Rn), find a u¯N−1(·) ∈ U [tN−2, tN−1] such that
(4.8) J˜
(
tN−2, ξN−2; u¯
N−1(·)
)
= essinf
uN−1(·)∈U [tN−2,tN−1]
J˜
(
tN−2, ξN−2, u
N−1(·)
)
.
Let us make some careful observation which will reveal the essential difference between the naive and
sophisticated recursive cost functionals. Recall that the original controlled FBSDE on [tN−2, tN ] is given by
(4.9)


dX(s) = b(s,X(s), u(s))ds+ σ(s,X(s), u(s))dW (s), s ∈ [tN−2, T ],
dY (s) = −g(tN−2, s,X(s), u(s), Y (s), Z(s))ds + Z(s)dW (s), s ∈ [tN−2, T ],
X(tN−2) = ξN−2, Y (T ) = h(tN−2, X(T )),
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and the naive recursive cost functional is given by
(4.10) J(tN−2, ξN−2;u(·)) = Y (tN−2; tN−2, ξ, u(·)), u(·) ∈ U [tN−2, T ].
If tN−2 is fixed (as a parameter), the above will lead to a time-consistent optimal control problem with
recursive cost functional. Consequently, if (X˜N−2(·), u˜N−2(·)) is an optimal pair (corresponding to the
initial pair (tN−2, ξN−2)), then
(4.11)
u˜N−2(s) = ˜uN−2(s, X˜N−2(s)), s ∈ [tN−2, T ],
˜uN−2(t, x) = ψ(tN−2, t, x, V˜ N−2(t, x), V˜ N−2x (t, x), V˜ N−2xx (t, x)), (t, x) ∈ [tN−2, T ]× Rn,
with V˜ N−2(· , ·) satisfying the following HJB equation:
(4.12)


V˜ N−2t (t, x) + inf
u∈U
H
(
tN−2, t, x, u, V˜
N−2(t, x), V˜ N−2x (t, x), V˜
N−2
xx (t, x)
)
= 0,
(t, x) ∈ [tN−2, T ]× R
n,
V˜ N−2(tN , x) = h(tN−2, x), x ∈ R
n.
Comparing (4.3) and (4.12), we see that on [tN−1, T ] × R
n, V Π(· , ·) and V˜ N−2(· , ·) satisfy different HJB
equations: The former has the parameter tN−1 and the later has the parameter tN−2. Hence, they are
different in general. Consequently, by further comparing (4.4) and (4.11), we see that uΠ(· , ·) and ˜uN−2(· , ·)
are different. In another word,
u˜N−2(·) = u¯N−1(·)⊕ uΠ(· ; X¯N−1(·))
fails in general. The right hand side of the above is called an equilibrium control of Problem (GΠ) on
[tN−2, T ], which is not an optimal control of Problem (N) on [tN−2, T ].
Now, we would like to obtain a better representation of the sophisticated cost functional (4.7) of Player
(N − 1). To this end, we look at the following closed-loop system on [tN−1, tN ]:
(4.13)


dXN−1(s) = b
(
s,XN−1(s),uΠ(s,XN−1(s))
)
ds+ σ
(
s,XN−1(s),uΠ(s,XN−1(s))
)
dW (s),
s ∈ [tN−1, tN ],
dY N−1(s) = −g
(
tN−2, s,X
N−1(s),uΠ(s,XN−1(s)), Y N−1(s), ZN−1(s)
)
ds+ ZN−1(s)dW (s),
s ∈ [tN−1, tN ],
XN−1(tN−1) = X
N−1(tN−1), Y
N−1(tN ) = h
(
tN−2, X
N−1(tN )
)
.
Inspired by Theorem 2.1, we introduce the following PDE:
(4.14)


ΘN−1t (t, x) +H
(
tN−2, t, x,u
Π(t, x),ΘN−1(t, x),ΘN−1x (t, x),Θ
N−1
xx (t, x)
)
= 0,
(t, x) ∈ [tN−1, tN ]× R
n,
ΘN−1(tN , x) = h(tN−2, x), x ∈ R
n.
If the above admits a unique classical solution ΘN−1(· , ·), then the following representation holds:
(4.15) Y N−1(s) = ΘN−1(s,XN−1(s)), s ∈ [tN−1, tN ].
In particular,
(4.16) Y N−1(tN−1) = Θ
N−1
(
tN−1, X
N−1(tN−1)
)
.
14
Consequently, the sophisticated cost functional will have the representation
(4.17) J˜(tN−2, ξN−2;u
N−1(·)) = Y N−1(tN−2; ξN−2, u
N−1(·)),
with (
XN−1(· ; ξN−2, u
N−1(·)), Y N−1(· ; ξN−2, u
N−1(·)), ZN−1(· ; ξN−2, u
N−1(·))
)
≡ (XN−1(·), Y N−1(·), ZN−1(·))
being the adapted solution to the following decoupled FBSDE:
(4.18)


dXN−1(s) = b
(
s,XN−1(s), uN−1(s)
)
ds+ σ
(
s,XN−1(s), uN−1(s)
)
dW (s), s ∈ [tN−2, tN−1),
dY N−1(s) = −g
(
tN−2, s,X
N−1(s), uN−1(s), Y N−1(s), ZN−1(s)
)
ds+ ZN−1(s)dW (s),
s ∈ [tN−2, tN−1),
XN−1(tN−2) = ξN−2, Y
N−1(tN−1) = Θ
N−1
(
tN−1, X
N−1(tN−1)
)
.
Then Problem (CN−1) becomes a standard recursive stochastic optimal control problem (on [tN−2, tN−1]).
Let the following HJB equation admits a classical solution:
(4.19)

V
Π
t (t, x) + inf
u∈U
H
(
tN−2, t, x, u, V
Π(t, x), V Πx (t, x), V
Π
xx(t, x)
)
= 0, (t, x) ∈ [tN−2, tN−1)× R
n,
V Π(tN−1 − 0, x) = Θ
N−1(tN−1, x), x ∈ R
n.
Similar to (4.4), we define
(4.20) uΠ(t, x) = ψ
(
tN−2, t, x, V
Π(t, x), V Πx (t, x), V
Π
xx(t, x)
)
, (t, x) ∈ [tN−2, tN−1)× R
n.
We assume the following FBSDE
(4.21)


dX¯N−1(s) = b
(
s, X¯N−1(s), uΠ(s, X¯N−1(s))
)
ds+ σ
(
s, X¯N−1(s), uΠ(s, X¯N−1(s))
)
dW (s),
s ∈ [tN−2, tN−1],
dY¯ N−1(s) = −g
(
tN−2, s, X¯
N−1(s), uΠ(s, X¯N−1(s)), Y¯ N−1(s), Z¯N−1(s)
)
ds+ Z¯N−1(s)dW (s),
s ∈ [tN−2, tN−1],
X¯N−1(tN−2) = ξN−2, Y¯
N−1(tN−1) = Θ
N−1
(
tN−1, X¯
N−1(tN−1)
)
admits a unique adapted solution. Then by Theorem 2.2, (X¯N−1(·),uΠ(· , X¯N−1(·))) is an optimal pair of
Problem (CN−1). The map u
Π(· , ·) defined by (4.20) is called an optimal strategy of Player (N − 1).
Now, combining the optimal strategies and value functions of Players N and (N − 1), we obtain that
both uΠ(· , ·) and V Π(· , ·) are defined on [tN−2, tN ]× R
n, with a possible jump at t = tN−1.
We write (4.4) and (4.20) compactly as
(4.22) uΠ(t, x) = ψ
(
ℓΠ(t), t, x, V Π(t, x), V Πx (t, x), V
Π
xx(t, x)
)
, (t, x) ∈
(
[tN−2, tN−1) ∪ (tN−1, tN ]
)
× Rn,
where ℓΠ(·) is defined by (3.7). From the above, we see that, respectively restricted in [tN−2, tN−1) and
(tN−1, tN ], u
Π(· , ·) is an optimal strategy of Player (N − 1) and Player N , respectively. However, in general
u
Π(· , ·) is not an optimal strategy on the whole interval [tN−2, tN ]. We call u
Π(· , ·) an equilibrium strategy
of Problem (GΠ) on [tN−2, tN ]. Further,(
X¯N−1(s),uΠ(s, X¯N−1(s))
)
, s ∈ [tN−2, tN ]
is called an equilibrium pair on [tN−2, tN ], where
X¯N−1(s) =

 X¯
N(s), s ∈ [tN−1, tN ],
X¯N−1(s), s ∈ [tN−2, tN−1).
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4.3 Player k and equilibria of Problem (GΠ)
The above procedure can be continued recursively. Suppose we have constructed the equilibrium strategy
u
Π(· , ·) and the equilibrium value function V Π(· , ·) on [tk, tN ]×R
n for Problem (GΠ). We now extend them
to [tk−1, tk)× R
n. On [tk−1, tk), Player k controls the system and he/she knows that later players will play
through the equilibrium strategy uΠ(· , ·), and meanwhile Player k “discounts” the future costs in his/her
own way. Hence, for any ξk−1 ∈ L
2
Ftk−1
(Ω;Rn) and uk(·) ∈ U [tk−1, tk], the controlled FBSDE for Player k
reads:
(4.23)


dXk(s) = b
(
s,Xk(s), uk(s)
)
ds+ σ
(
s,Xk(s), uk(s)
)
dW (s), s ∈ [tk−1, tk),
dXk(s) = b
(
s,Xk(s),uΠ(s,Xk(s))
)
ds+ σ
(
s,Xk(s),uΠ(s,Xk(s))
)
dW (s), s ∈ [tk, tN ],
dY k(s) = −g
(
tk−1, s,X
k(s), uk(s), Y k(s), Zk(s)
)
ds+ Zk(s)dW (s), s ∈ [tk−1, tk),
dY k(s) = −g
(
tk−1, s,X
k(s),uΠ(s,Xk(s)), Y k(s), Zk(s)
)
ds+ Zk(s)dW (s), s ∈ [tk, tN ],
Xk(tk−1) = ξk−1, Y
k(tN ) = h
(
tk−1, X
k(tN )
)
.
Suppose (Xk(·), Y k(·), Zk(·)) is the adapted solution to the above. Then the sophisticated recursive cost
functional of Player k is defined as follows:
J˜(tk−1, ξk−1;u
k(·)) = J
(
tk−1, ξk−1;u
k(·)⊕ uΠ(· , Xk(·))
)
= Y k(tk−1).
The optimal control problem of Player k is given by
Problem (Ck). For any ξk−1 ∈ L
2
Ftk−1
(Ω : Rn), find a u¯k(·) ∈ U [tk−1, tk] such that
(4.24) J˜(tk−1, ξk−1; u¯
k(·)) = essinf
uk(·)∈U [tk−1,tk]
J˜(tk−1, ξk−1;u
k(·)).
To get a better representation for the sophisticated recursive cost functional of Player k, we introduce
the following PDE associated with a part of (4.23):
(4.25)

Θ
k
t (t, x) +H
(
tk−1, t, x,u
Π(t, x),Θk(t, x),Θkx(t, x),Θ
k
xx(t, x)
)
= 0, (t, x) ∈ [tk, tN ]× R
n,
Θk(tN , x) = h(tk−1, x), x ∈ R
n.
Under proper conditions, PDE (4.25) admits a classical solution Θk(· , ·), and Theorem 2.1 leads to
(4.26) Y k(tk) = Θ
k
(
tk, X
k(tk)
)
.
Remark 4.1. From the definition, uΠ(·, ·) (see (4.22) for the case of k = N − 1) may have jumps at
tk+1, tk+2, . . . , tN−1 in general. Due to this, by saying Θ
k(· , ·) being the classical solution of (4.25), we
mean that Θk(· , ·) is continuous, on all intervals [tN−1, tN ], [tN−2, tN−1),...,[tk, tk+1), Θ
k(· , ·) is the classical
solution, and Θkx(· , ·) and Θ
k
xx(· , ·) are allowed to have jumps at tN−1, tN−2, · · · , tk+1. For simplicity of
notations, we write in a compact form (4.25).
The FBSDE controlled by Player k on the interval [tk−1, tk] is given by
(4.27)


dXk(s) = b
(
s,Xk(s), uk(s)
)
ds+ σ
(
s,Xk(s), uk(s)
)
dW (s), s ∈ [tk−1, tk],
dY k(s) = −g
(
tk−1, s,X
k(s), uk(s), Y k(s), Zk(s)
)
ds+ Zk(s)dW (s), s ∈ [tk−1, tk],
Xk(tk−1) = ξk−1, Y
k(tk) = Θ
k
(
tk, X
k(tk)
)
.
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Under proper conditions, the following HJB equation
(4.28)

V
Π
t (t, x) + inf
u∈U
H
(
tk−1, t, x, u, V
Π(t, x), V Πx (t, x), V
Π
xx(t, x)
)
= 0, (t, x) ∈ [tk−1, tk)× R
n,
V Π(tk − 0, x) = Θ
k(tk, x), x ∈ R
n,
admits a classical solution V Π(· , ·) ∈ C1,2([tk−1, tk)× R
n). Define
(4.29)
u
Π(t, x) = ψ(tk−1, t, x, V
Π(t, x), V Πx (t, x), V
Π
xx(t, x)),
= ψ(ℓΠ(t), t, x, V Π(t, x), V Πx (t, x), V
Π
xx(t, x)), (t, x) ∈ [tk−1, tk)× R
n.
Moreover, we assume the following FBSDE
(4.30)


dX¯k(s) = b
(
s, X¯k(s),uΠ(s, X¯k(s))
)
ds+ σ
(
s, X¯k(s),uΠ(s, X¯k(s))
)
dW (s), s ∈ [tk−1, tk],
dY¯ k(s) = −g
(
tk−1, s, X¯
k(s),uΠ(s, X¯k(s)), Y¯ k(s), Z¯k(s)
)
ds+ Z¯k(s)dW (s), s ∈ [tk−1, tk],
X¯k(tk−1) = ξk−1, Y¯
k(tk) = Θ
k
(
tk, X¯
k(tk)
)
admits a unique adapted solution. Then, by Theorem 2.2, uΠ(· , ·) defined by (4.29) is an optimal strategy
of Player k. Further, both V Π(· , ·) and uΠ(· , ·) are now defined on [tk−1, tN ]× R
n.
By induction, we are able to obtain V Π(· , ·) and uΠ(· , ·) defined on [0, tN ]× R
n. We point out that the
construction of V Π(· , ·) and uΠ(· , ·) is recursive. For the later purpose of taking the limits, let us summarize
the procedure of construction.
Step 1. Define value function V Π(· , ·) on [tN−1, tN ]× R
n through HJB equation:
(4.31)

V
Π
t (t, x) + inf
u∈U
H
(
tN−1, t, x, u, V
Π(t, x), V Πx (t, x), V
Π
xx(t, x)
)
= 0, (t, x) ∈ [tN−1, tN ]× R
n,
V Π(tN , x) = h(tN−1, x), x ∈ R
n.
Having V Π(· , ·) defined on [tN−1, tN ]×R
n, we define equilibrium strategy function uΠ(· , ·) on [tN−1, tN ]×R
n
as follows (recalling ψ(·) from (H2)):
(4.32) uΠ(t, x) = ψ(tN−1, t, x, V
Π(t, x), V Πx (t, x), V
Π
xx(t, x)), (t, x) ∈ [tN−1, tN ]× R
n.
Step 2. Define the representation function ΘN−1(· , ·) on [tN−1, tN ]× R
n by the following equation:
(4.33)


ΘN−1t (t, x) +H
(
tN−2, t, x,u
Π(t, x),ΘN−1(t, x),ΘN−1x (t, x),Θ
N−1
xx (t, x)
)
= 0,
(t, x) ∈ [tN−1, tN ]× R
n,
ΘN−1(tN , x) = h(tN−2, x), x ∈ R
n.
Note that (4.33) is different from (4.31) since tN−1 is replaced by tN−2. Consequently, in general, the
following fails:
(4.34) ΘN−1(t, x) = V Π(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [tN−1, tN ]× R
n.
In particular, the following could fail:
(4.35) ΘN−1(tN−1, x) = V
Π(tN−1, x), x ∈ R
n.
Now, define the value function V Π(· , ·) on [tN−2, tN−1)×R
n to be the solution to the following HJB equation:
(4.36)

V
Π
t (t, x) + inf
u∈U
H
(
tN−2, t, x, u, V
Π(t, x), V Πx (t, x), V
Π
xx(t, x)
)
= 0, (t, x) ∈ [tN−2, tN−1)× R
n,
V Π(tN−1 − 0, x) = Θ
N−1(tN−1, x), x ∈ R
n.
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Due to the fact that (4.35) fails, V Π(· , ·) might have a jump at t = tN−1. Having V
Π(· , ·) on [tN−2, tN−1)×
R
n, we define equilibrium strategy function uΠ(· , ·) on [tN−2, tN−1)× R
n as follows:
(4.37) uΠ(t, x) = ψ(tN−2, t, x, V
Π(t, x), V Πx (t, x), V
Π
xx(t, x)), (t, x) ∈ [tN−2, tN−1)× R
n.
Step 3. Define the representation function ΘN−2(· , ·) on [tN−2, tN ]× R
n by the following equation:
(4.38)


ΘN−2t (t, x) +H
(
tN−3, t, x,u
Π(t, x),ΘN−2(t, x),ΘN−2x (t, x),Θ
N−2
xx (t, x)
)
= 0,
(t, x) ∈ [tN−2, tN ]× R
n,
ΘN−2(tN , x) = h(tN−3, x), x ∈ R
n.
Note that the time interval for (4.38) is [tN−2, tN ], instead of [tN−2, tN−1]. Also, unlike (4.36), tN−3 appears,
instead of tN−2. Thus, in general, the following fails:
(4.39) ΘN−2(tN−2, x) = V
Π(tN−2, x), x ∈ R
n.
Now, we define the value function V Π(· , ·) on [tN−3, tN−2) × R
n to be the solution to the following HJB
equation:
(4.40)

V
Π
t (t, x) + inf
u∈U
H
(
tN−3, t, x, u, V
Π(t, x), V Πx (t, x), V
Π
xx(t, x)
)
= 0, (t, x) ∈ [tN−3, tN−2)× R
n,
V Π(tN−2 − 0, x) = Θ
N−2(tN−2, x), x ∈ R
n.
Since (4.39) may fail, V Π(· , ·) might have a jump at t = tN−2. Having V
Π(· , ·) on [tN−3, tN−2) × R
n, we
define equilibrium strategy function uΠ(· , ·) on [tN−3, tN−2)× R
n as follows:
(4.41) uΠ(t, x) = ψ(tN−3, t, x, V
Π(t, x), V Πx (t, x), V
Π
xx(t, x)), (t, x) ∈ [tN−3, tN−2)× R
n.
The rest steps now are clear.
We write the constructed equilibrium strategy on the whole interval [0, T ] for Problem (GΠ) as follows:
(4.42) uΠ(t, x) = ψ
(
ℓΠ(t), t, x, V Π(t, x), V Πx (t, x), V
Π
xx(t, x)
)
, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.
Then for any given x ∈ Rn, let XΠ(·) be the solution to the following SDE:
(4.43)

 dX
Π(s) = b
(
s,XΠ(s),uΠ(s,XΠ(s))
)
ds+ σ
(
s,XΠ(s),uΠ(s,XΠ(s))
)
dW (s), s ∈ [0, T ],
XΠ(0) = x.
Correspondingly, in (4.30), we take
ξk−1 = X
Π(tk−1), 1 6 k 6 N.
Then
(4.44) XΠ(s) = X¯k
(
s; tk−1, X¯
k−1(tk−1),u
Π(·)
)
, s ∈ [tk−1, tk), k = 1, 2, . . . , N,
with X¯0(t0) = x. For any tk ∈ Π \ {tN}, let (Y
Π(tk, ·), Z
Π(tk, ·)) be the adapted solution to the following
BSDE:
(4.45)


dY Π(tk, s) = −g
(
tk, s,X
Π(s),uΠ(s,XΠ(s)), Y Π(tk, x), Z
Π(tk, s)
)
ds+ ZΠ(tk, s)dW (s),
s ∈ [tk, T ],
Y Π(tk, T ) = h
(
tk, X
Π(T )
)
.
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Then from (4.23), (4.26) and (4.30), we have
(4.46)

Y
Π(tk−1, s) = Y
k(s; tk−1, X¯
k−1(tk−1),u
Π(·)),
ZΠ(tk−1, s) = Z
k(s; tk−1, X¯
k−1(tk−1),u
Π(·)),
s ∈ [tk−1, T ], k = 1, 2, · · · , N.
Since, for any k = 1, 2, · · · , N , uΠ(·)|[tk−1,tk] is an optimal strategy of Problem (Ck), then (3.4) holds
true. If we set
u¯k(·) = uΠ(· , XΠ(·))|[tk−1,tk], 1 6 k 6 N,
then (u¯1(·), u¯2(·), · · · , u¯N(·)) can be regarded as a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding N -person non-
cooperative differential game (see [24] for details).
4.4 The formal limits
Through an observation on (4.25) and (4.28), together with (4.29), we see that Θk(· , ·) can be extended
naturally from [tk, tN ]× R
n to [tk−1, tN ]× R
n as follows:
(4.47) Θk(t, x) ≡ V Π(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [tk−1, tk)× R
n, k = 1, 2, · · · , N.
Then from (4.25) and (4.28), we see that extended Θk(· , ·) satisfies
(4.48)

Θ
k
t (t, x) +H
(
tk−1, t, x,u
Π(t, x),Θk(t, x),Θkx(t, x),Θ
k
xx(t, x)
)
= 0, (t, x) ∈ [tk−1, tN ]× R
n,
Θk(tN , x) = h(tk−1, x), x ∈ R
n.
Let us define
(4.49)


ΘΠ(τ, t, x) =
N∑
k=1
Θk(t, x)1[tk−1,tk)(τ), (τ, t, x) ∈ D[0, T ]× R
n,
hΠ(τ, x) =
N∑
k=1
h(tk−1, x)1[tk−1,tk)(τ), (τ, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R
n,
gΠ(τ, t, x, u, y, z) =
N∑
k=1
g(tk−1, t, x, u, y, z)1[tk−1,tk)(τ),
(τ, t, x, u, y, z) ∈ D[0, T ]× Rn × U × R× R1×d.
Then ΘΠ(· , · , ·) satisfies the following PDE:
(4.50)


ΘΠt (τ, t, x) +H
Π
(
τ, t, x,uΠ(t, x),ΘΠ(τ, t, x),ΘΠx (τ, t, x),Θ
Π
xx(τ, t, x)
)
= 0,
(τ, t, x) ∈ D[0, T ]× Rn,
ΘΠ(τ, T, x) = hΠ(τ, x), (τ, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
where
H
Π(τ, t, x, u, θ, p, P ) = tr
[
a(t, x, u)P
]
+ 〈 b(t, x, u), p 〉+gΠ
(
τ, t, x, u, θ, p⊤σ(t, x, u)
)
,
(τ, t, x, u, θ, p, P ) ∈ D[0, T ]× Rn × U × R× Rn × Sn.
Since for any k = 1, 2, · · · , N ,
u
Π(t, x) = ψ
(
tk−1, t, x, V
Π(t, x), V Πx (t, x), V
Π
xx(t, x)
)
= ψ
(
tk−1, t, x,Θ
k(t, x),Θkx(t, x),Θ
k
xx(t, x)
)
, (t, x) ∈ [tk−1, tk)× R
n,
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one has
u
Π(t, x) =
N∑
k=1
ψ
(
tk−1, t, x,Θ
k(t, x),Θkx(t, x),Θ
k
xx(t, x)
)
1[tk−1,tk)(t)
= ψ
( N∑
k=1
tk−11[tk−1,tk)(t), t, x,
N∑
k=1
Θk(t, x)1[tk−1,tk)(t),
N∑
k=1
Θkx(t, x)1[tk−1,tk)(t),
N∑
k=1
Θkxx(t, x)1[tk−1,tk)(t)
)
= ψ
(
ℓΠ(t), t, x,ΘΠ(t, t, x),ΘΠx (t, t, x),Θ
Π
xx(t, t, x)
)
, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.
Now, we would like to study the behavior when ‖Π‖ → 0 formally to get the limit equations. In the
next section, we will prove the formal limits can be made rigorous under some conditions. We introduce the
following assumption temporarily.
(H3) There exists a function Θ(·, ·, ·) ∈ C0,0,2(D[0, T ]× Rn) such that
lim
‖Π‖→0
(
|ΘΠ(τ, t, x)−Θ(τ, t, x)|+ |ΘΠx (τ, t, x)−Θx(τ, t, x)| + |Θ
Π
xx(τ, t, x)−Θxx(τ, t, x)|
)
= 0,
(τ, t, x) ∈ D[0, T ]× Rn,
uniformly for (τ, t, x) in any compact sets.
Under (H3), with the help of (H2), we also have
lim
‖Π‖→0
|uΠ(t, x)− u(t, x)| = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
uniformly for (t, x) in any compact sets, where
(4.51) u(t, x) = ψ
(
t, t, x,Θ(t, t, x),Θx(t, t, x),Θxx(t, t, x)
)
, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.
Therefore, we have
lim
‖Π‖→0
‖XΠ(·)− X¯(·)‖L2
F
(Ω;C([0,T ];Rn)) = 0,
where X¯(·) is the solution to the following SDE:
(4.52)

 dX¯(s) = b
(
s, X¯(s),u(s, X¯(s))
)
ds+ σ
(
s, X¯(s),u(s, X¯(s))
)
dW (s), s ∈ [0, T ],
X¯(0) = x,
and
L2
F
(Ω;C([0, T ];Rn)) =
{
X : [0, T ]× Ω→ Rn
∣∣ X(·) is an F-progressively measurable process
with continuous paths such that E
[
sup
s∈[0,T ]
|X(s)|2
]
<∞
}
.
Moreover, for any t ∈ [0, T ],
lim
‖Π‖→0
(
‖Y Π(ℓΠ(t), ·) − Y¯ (t, ·)‖L2
F
(Ω;C([0,T ];R)) + ‖Z
Π(ℓΠ(t), ·)− Z¯(t, ·)‖L2
F
(0,T ;R1×d)
)
= 0,
where (Y¯ (t, ·), Z¯(t, ·)) is the solution the following BSDE:
(4.53)

 dY¯ (t, s) = −g
(
t, s, X¯(s),u(s, X¯(s)), Y¯ (t, s), Z¯(t, s)
)
ds+ Z(t, s)dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
Y¯ (t, T ) = h
(
t, X¯(T )
)
,
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and
L2
F
(0, T ;R1×d) =
{
Z : [0, T ]× Ω→ R1×d
∣∣ Z(·) is an F-progressively measurable process
such that E
∫ T
0
|Z(s)|2ds <∞
}
.
Furthermore, it is clear
J
(
ℓΠ(t), XΠ(ℓΠ(t)),uΠ(·)
)
= Y Π(ℓΠ(t), ℓΠ(t)) =
N∑
k=1
Y k
(
tk−1; tk−1, X¯
k−1(tk−1),u
Π(·)
)
1[tk−1,tk)(t)
=
N∑
k=1
V Π
(
tk−1, X¯
k−1(tk−1)
)
1[tk−1,tk)(t) =
N∑
k=1
Θk
(
tk−1, X¯
k−1(tk−1)
)
1[tk−1,tk)(t)
= ΘΠ
(
ℓΠ(t), ℓΠ(t), XΠ(ℓΠ(t))
)
, t ∈ [0, T ].
By taking limits, we have
J
(
t, X¯(t),uΠ(·)
)
= Y¯ (t, t) = Θ
(
t, t, X¯(t)
)
,
which coincides with (3.8). By Definition 3.1, u(· , ·) is a time-consistent equilibrium strategy, and
V (t, x) ≡ Θ(t, t, x), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn
is a time-consistent equilibrium value function of Problem (N).
Next, we come back to (4.50) and try to derive the limit equation of (4.50) which is used to characterize
the equilibrium value function V (· , ·) or the more general function Θ(· , · , ·). For this aim, we rewrite (4.50)
in the following integral form:
(4.54)
ΘΠ(τ, t, x) = hΠ(τ, x) +
∫ T
t
H
Π
(
τ, s, x,uΠ(s, x),ΘΠ(τ, s, x),ΘΠx (τ, s, x),Θ
Π
xx(τ, s, x)
)
ds,
(τ, t, x) ∈ D[0, T ]× Rn,
and introduce the following assumption:
(H4) There exists a constant L > 0 such that
|hτ (τ, x)| + |gτ (τ, t, x, u, y, z)| 6 K, ∀ (τ, t, x, u, y, z) ∈ D[0, T ]× R
n × U × R× R1×d.
Under Assumptions (H1)-(H4), we know

lim
‖Π‖→0
hΠ(τ, x) = h(τ, x), (τ, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
lim
‖Π‖→0
gΠ
(
τ, s, x,uΠ(s, x),ΘΠ(τ, s, x),ΘΠx (τ, s, x)
⊤σ(s, x,uΠ(s, x))
)
= g
(
τ, s, x,u(s, x),Θ(τ, s, x),Θx(τ, s, x)
⊤σ(s, x,u(s, x))
)
, (τ, s, x) ∈ D[0, T ]× Rn,
which leads to
lim
‖Π‖→0
H
Π
(
τ, s, x,uΠ(s, x),ΘΠ(τ, s, x),ΘΠx (τ, s, x),Θ
Π
xx(τ, s, x)
)
= H
(
τ, s, x,u(s, x),Θ(τ, s, x),Θx(τ, s, x),Θxx(τ, s, x)
)
, (τ, s, x) ∈ D[0, T ]× Rn.
Therefore, letting ‖Π‖ → 0 in (4.54), we get the function Θ(· , · , ·) satisfying the following equation:
(4.55)
Θ(τ, t, x) = h(τ, x) +
∫ T
t
H
(
τ, s, x,u(s, x),Θ(τ, s, x),Θx(τ, s, x),Θxx(τ, s, x)
)
ds,
(τ, t, x) ∈ D[0, T ]× Rn,
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or in the differential form:
(4.56)

Θt(τ, t, x) +H
(
τ, t, x,u(t, x),Θ(τ, t, x),Θx(τ, t, x),Θxx(τ, t, x)
)
= 0, (τ, t, x) ∈ D[0, T ]× Rn,
Θ(τ, T, x) = h(τ, x), (τ, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
where H(·) is defined by (2.1) and u(· , ·) is defined by (4.51). We call (4.56) or (4.55) the equilibrium
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (equilibrium HJB equation, for short) of Problem (N).
5 Well-Posedness of the Equilibrium HJB Equation
In this section, we will present the well-posedness of equation (4.56) to some extent. First of all, some
observations on (4.56) are made as follows:
• System (4.56) is a fully nonlinear PDE, but not in a classical form. Note that both Θ(τ, t, x) and
Θ(t, t, x) appear in the equation at the same time, where Θ(t, t, x) is the restriction of Θ(τ, t, x) on τ = t,
which make the existing theory of fully nonlinear PDEs cannot be applied directly to (4.56) for its well-
posedness.
• The recursive costs in our time-inconsistent control problem (N) bring some differences from the problem
studied in [24], particularly reflecting on the equilibrium HJB equation. If Θ(t, t, x) could be obtained from
an independent way, the equilibrium HJB equation developed in [24] is in fact a linear PDE with respect to
Θ(τ, t, x) where τ could be regarded as a parameter. While in the current situation, it is different now. In
fact, (4.56) will still be a nonlinear one in spite of Θ(t, t, x) is known in advance.
• Notice the expression: u(t, x) = ψ
(
t, t, x,Θ(t, t, x),Θx(t, t, x),Θxx(t, t, x)
)
. From the definition of ψ
(see Assumption (H2)), it is clear that the dependence of σ on the control variable u leads to the appearance
of Θxx(t, t, x) in u(t, x). It turns out that the appearance of Θxx(t, t, x) will bring some essential difficulties
in establishing the well-posedness of equilibrium HJB equation. At the moment, we are not able to overcome
the difficulty. We hope to come back in our future publications. In the current paper, having formally
derived the general equilibrium HJB equation, we will establish its well-posedness for a special, but still
important case. More precisely, we assume that
(5.1) σ(t, x, u) = σ(t, x), (t, x, u) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × U,
in the following study.
Under (5.1), the equilibrium HJB equation (4.56) reads
(5.2)


Θt(τ, t, x) + tr
[
a(t, x)Θxx(τ, t, x)
]
+ 〈 b
(
t, x,u(t, x)), Θx(τ, t, x) 〉
+g
(
τ, t, x,u(t, x),Θ(τ, t, x),Θx(τ, t, x)
⊤σ(t, x)
)
= 0, (τ, t, x) ∈ D[0, T ]× Rn,
Θ(τ, T, x) = h(τ, x), (τ, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
where
(5.3) u(t, x) = ψ
(
t, t, x,Θ(t, t, x),Θx(t, t, x)
)
, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.
To avoid heavy notations, we simplify (5.2) as follows:
(5.4)


Θt(τ, t, x) + tr
[
a(t, x)Θxx(τ, t, x)
]
+ 〈 b(t, x,Θ(t, t, x),Θx(t, t, x)), Θx(τ, t, x) 〉
+g
(
τ, t, x,Θ(t, t, x),Θx(t, t, x),Θ(τ, t, x),Θx(τ, t, x)
)
= 0, (τ, t, x) ∈ D[0, T ]× Rn,
Θ(τ, T, x) = h(τ, x), (τ, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
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where 

b(t, x, θ¯, p¯) = b(t, x, ψ(t, t, x, θ¯, p¯)), (t, x, θ¯, p¯) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × R× Rn,
g(τ, t, x, θ¯, p¯, θ, p) = g(τ, t, x, ψ(t, t, x, θ¯, p¯), θ, p⊤σ(t, x)),
(τ, t, x, θ¯, p¯, θ, p) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × R× Rn × R× Rn.
Next, we introduce some spaces. For any α ∈ (0, 1), we let
• Cα(Rn) be the set of all continuous functions: ϕ : Rn → R such that
‖ϕ‖α = ‖ϕ‖0 + [ϕ]α <∞,
where
‖ϕ‖0 = sup
x∈Rn
|ϕ(x)|, [ϕ]α = sup
x,y∈Rn,x 6=y
|ϕ(x) − ϕ(y)|
|x− y|α
,
• C1+α(Rn) be the set of all continuously differentiable functions: ϕ : Rn → R such that
‖ϕ‖1+α = ‖ϕ‖0 + ‖ϕx‖0 + [ϕx]α <∞,
• C2+α(Rn) be the set of all twice continuously differential functions: ϕ : Rn → R such that
‖ϕ‖2+α = ‖ϕ‖0 + ‖ϕx‖0 + ‖ϕxx‖0 + [ϕxx]α <∞,
• B([0, T ];Ck+α(Rn)) (k = 0, 1, 2) be the set of all measurable functions f : [0, T ]× Rn → R such that
for any t ∈ [0, T ], f(t, ·) ∈ Ck+α(Rn) and
‖f(· , ·)‖B([0,T ];Ck+α(Rn)) = sup
t∈[0,T ]
‖f(t, ·)‖k+α <∞,
• C([0, T ];Ck+α(Rn)) (k = 0, 1, 2) be the subset of B([0, T ];Ck+α(Rn)) consisting of all continuous
functions.
We also need the following assumption.
(A) The maps a : [0, T ]×Rn → Sn, b : [0, T ]×Rn×R×Rn → Rn, g : D[0, T ]×Rn×R×Rn×R×Rn → R,
and h : [0, T ]× Rn → R are continuous and bounded. Moreover, there exists a constant L > 0 such that
|ax(t, x)|+ |bx(t, x, θ¯, p¯)|+ |gx(τ, t, x, θ¯, p¯, θ, p)|+ |bθ¯(t, x, θ¯, p¯)|+ |gθ¯(τ, t, x, θ¯, p¯, θ, p)|+ |bp¯(t, x, θ¯, p¯)|
+|gp¯(τ, t, x, θ¯, p¯, θ, p)|+ |gθ(τ, t, x, θ¯, p¯, θ, p)|+ |gp(τ, t, x, θ¯, p¯, θ, p)|+ |hx(τ, x)|+ |hτx(τ, x)| 6 L,
(τ, t, x, θ¯, p¯, θ, p) ∈ D[0, T ]× Rn × R× Rn × R× Rn.
Furthermore, a(t, x)−1 exists for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn and there exist constants λ0, λ1 > 0 such that
λ0I 6 a(t, x)
−1
6 λ1I, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R
n.
For any v(· , ·) ∈ C([0, T ];C1(Rn)), we consider the following semi-linear PDE parameterized by τ ∈ [0, T ]:
(5.5)


Θt(τ, t, x) + tr
[
a(t, x)Θxx(τ, t, x)
]
+ 〈 b(t, x, v(t, x), vx(t, x)), Θx(τ, t, x) 〉
+g
(
τ, t, x, v(t, x), vx(t, x),Θ(τ, t, x),Θx(τ, t, x)
)
= 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
Θ(τ, T, x) = h(τ, x), x ∈ Rn,
which admits a unique solution by the classical theory. In order to derive the well-posedness of (5.4), we
will utilize the above semi-linear PDE to establish a contraction mapping from v(· , ·) to V (· , ·), where
V (t, x) = Θ(t, t, x), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn. The details will be presented in the following theorem.
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Theorem 5.1. Under Assumption (A), equation (5.4) admits a unique solution.
Proof. By the fundamental solution theory of parabolic PDE (see Friedman [9]), for any v(· , ·) ∈
C([0, T ];C1(Rn)), the solution of (5.5) can be expressed as
(5.6)
Θ(τ, t, x) =
∫
Rn
Γ(t, x;T, y)h(τ, y)dy +
∫ T
t
∫
Rn
Γ(t, x; s, y)
[
〈 b(s, y, v(s, y), vx(s, y)),Θx(τ, s, y) 〉
+g(τ, s, y, v(s, y), vx(s, y),Θ(τ, s, y),Θx(τ, s, y))
]
dyds, (t, x) ∈ [τ, T ]× Rn,
where Γ(t, x; s, y) called the fundamental solution is defined on [0, T ]× Rn × [0, T ]× Rn with t < s and
Γ(t, x; s, y) =
1
(4π(s− t))
n
2 (det[a(s, y)])
1
2
e
−〈 a(s,y)−1(x−y),x−y 〉
4(s−t) .
Some direct calculation leads to the following estimates:
(5.7)


|Γ(t, x; s, y)| 6 K
e
−λ|x−y|
2
4(s−t)
(s− t)
n
2
,
|Γx(t, x; s, y)| 6 K
e
−
λ|x−y|2
4(s−t)
(s− t)
n+1
2
,
λ < λ0,
where K > 0 is a constant which can be different from line to line. Moreover,
(5.8) Γy(t, x; s, y) = −Γx(t, x; s, y)− Γ(t, x; s, y)ρ(t, x; s, y),
where 

ρ(t, x; s, y) =
(det[a(s, y)])y
2 det[a(s, y)]
+
〈[a(s, y)−1]y(x − y), x− y 〉
4(s− t)
,
〈[a(s, y)−1]y(x − y), x− y 〉 =


〈[a(s, y)−1]y1(x− y), x− y 〉
〈[a(s, y)−1]y2(x− y), x− y 〉
...
〈[a(s, y)−1]yn(x− y), x− y 〉

 .
It is easy to check, under (A),
(5.9) |ρ(t, x; s, y)| 6 K
(
1 +
|x− y|2
s− t
)
.
We now split the rest of the proof into several steps.
Step 1. We prove Θx(τ, t, x) is bounded, i.e.,
|Θx(τ, t, x)| 6 K(1 + ‖h(τ, ·)‖C1(Rn)), (t, x) ∈ [τ, T ]× R
n.
Combined (5.8) with the method of integration by parts, we get
(5.10)
∫
Rn
Γx(t, x;T, y)h(τ, y)dy = −
∫
Rn
Γy(t, x;T, y)h(τ, y)dy −
∫
Rn
Γ(t, x;T, y)ρ(t, x;T, y)h(τ, y)dy
=
∫
Rn
Γ(t, x;T, y)hy(τ, y)dy −
∫
Rn
Γ(t, x;T, y)ρ(t, x;T, y)h(τ, y)dy,
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then
(5.11)
Θx(τ, t, x) =
∫
Rn
Γ(t, x;T, y)hy(τ, y)dy −
∫
Rn
Γ(t, x;T, y)ρ(t, x;T, y)h(τ, y)dy
+
∫ T
t
∫
Rn
Γx(t, x; s, y)
[
〈 b(s, y, v(s, y), vx(s, y)),Θx(τ, s, y) 〉
+g(τ, s, y, v(s, y), vx(s, y),Θ(τ, s, y),Θx(τ, s, y))
]
dyds.
Therefore, from Estimates (5.7) and Assumption (A), we get
(5.12)
|Θx(τ, t, x)| 6
∫
Rn
K
e
−λ|x−y|
2
4(T−t)
(T − t)
n
2
[
|hy(τ, y)|+
(
1 +
|x− y|2
T − t
)
|h(τ, y)|
]
dy
+
∫ T
t
∫
Rn
K
e
−
λ|x−y|2
4(s−t)
(s− t)
n+1
2
(
|Θx(τ, s, y)|+ 1
)
dyds
6 K
(
1 + ‖h(τ, ·)‖C1(Rn)
)
+
∫ T
t
∫
Rn
K
e
−λ|x−y|
2
4(s−t)
(s− t)
n+1
2
|Θx(τ, s, y)|dyds.
By Gronwall’s inequality, we obtain
(5.13) |Θx(τ, t, x)| 6 K
(
1 + ‖h(τ, ·)‖C1(Rn)
)
, (t, x) ∈ [τ, T ]× Rn.
Step 2. For any v1(· , ·), v2(· , ·) ∈ C([0, T ];C1(Rn)), let Θ1(· , · , ·) and Θ2(· , · , ·) be the corresponding
solutions to (5.6). We want to prove
(5.14) Θ1(τ, t, x)−Θ2(τ, t, x)| + |Θ1x(τ, t, x)−Θ
2
x(τ, t, x)| 6 K(T − t)
1
2 ‖v1(· , ·)− v2(· , ·)‖C([τ,T ];C1(Rn))
holds true for any (t, x) ∈ [τ, T ]× Rn. To this end, for any (τ, t, x) ∈ D[0, T ]× Rn, we denote

∆v(t, x) = v1(t, x)− v2(t, x),
∆Θ(τ, t, x) = Θ1(τ, t, x)−Θ2(τ, t, x),
∆b(t, x) = b(t, x, v1(t, x), v1x(t, x)) − b(t, x, v
2(t, x), v2x(t, x)),
∆g(τ, t, x) = g(τ, t, x, v1(t, x), v1x(t, x),Θ
1(τ, t, x),Θ1x(τ, t, x))
−g(τ, t, x, v2(t, x), v2x(t, x),Θ
2(τ, t, x),Θ2x(τ, t, x)).
Then, we have
(5.15)
|∆Θ(τ, t, x)| =
∣∣∣ ∫ T
t
∫
Rn
Γ(t, x; s, y)
[
〈∆b(s, y),Θ1x(τ, s, y) 〉
+ 〈 b(s, y, v2(s, y), v2x(s, y)),∆Θx(τ, s, y) 〉+∆g(τ, s, y)
]
dyds
∣∣∣.
By Estimates (5.7), (5.13), and Assumption (A),
(5.16)
|∆Θ(τ, t, x)| 6
∫ T
t
∫
Rn
K
e
−λ|x−y|
2
4(s−t)
(s− t)
n
2
[(
|∆v(s, y)|+ |∆vx(s, y)|
)(
1 + |Θ1x(τ, s, y)|
)
+|∆Θ(τ, s, y)|+ |∆Θx(τ, s, y)|
]
dyds
6 K(T − t)
(
1 + ‖h(τ, ·)‖C1(Rn)
)
‖∆v(· , ·)‖C([τ,T ];C1(Rn))
+
∫ T
t
∫
Rn
K
e
−λ|x−y|
2
4(s−t)
(s− t)
n
2
[
|∆Θ(τ, s, y)|+ |∆Θx(τ, s, y)|
]
dyds.
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Similarly,
(5.17)
|∆Θx(τ, t, x)| 6 K(T − t)
1
2
(
1 + ‖h(τ, ·)‖C1(Rn)
)
‖∆v(· , ·)‖C([τ,T ];C1(Rn))
+
∫ T
t
∫
Rn
K
e
−λ|x−y|
2
4(s−t)
(s− t)
n+1
2
[
|∆Θ(τ, s, y)|+ |∆Θx(τ, s, y)|
]
dyds.
Then, by combining (5.16) and (5.17), we have
(5.18)
|∆Θ(τ, t, x)|+ |∆Θx(τ, t, x)| 6 K(T − t)
1
2
(
1 + ‖h(τ, ·)‖C1(Rn)
)
‖∆v(· , ·)‖C([τ,T ];C1(Rn))
+
∫ T
t
∫
Rn
K
e
−λ|x−y|
2
4(s−t)
(s− t)
n+1
2
[
|∆Θ(τ, s, y)|+ |∆Θx(τ, s, y)|
]
dyds.
Gronwall’s inequality works again to yield
(5.19) ‖∆Θ(τ, · , ·)‖C([τ,T ];C1(Rn)) 6 K(T − t)
1
2
(
1 + ‖h(τ, ·)‖C1(Rn)
)
‖∆v(· , ·)‖C([τ,T ];C1(Rn)).
We note that the constant K > 0 appearing in the above is independent of (τ, t) ∈ D[0, T ].
Step 3. Denoting V i(t, x) = Θi(t, t, x) (i = 1, 2) and taking τ = t in (5.19), we get
(5.20)
‖V 1(· , ·)− V 2(· , ·)‖C([t,T ];C1(Rn))
6 K(T − t)
1
2
(
1 + ‖h(· , ·)‖B([0,T ];C1(Rn))
)
‖v1(· , ·)− v2(· , ·)‖C([t,T ];C1(Rn)).
Obviously, a contraction mapping v(· , ·) 7→ V (· , ·) on C([T − δ, T ];C1(Rn)) is obtained by choosing δ > 0
small enough. Accordingly, this map has a unique fixed point on [T − δ, T ]. Furthermore, similar estimates
on [T − 2δ, T − δ], [T − 3δ, T − 2δ], · · · , till to [0, δ] are derived as above so that the map v(· , ·) 7→ V (· , ·)
admits a unique fixed point on the whole space C([0, T ];C1(Rn)). Therefore, we get the well-posedness of
the following integro-differential equation:
(5.21)
Θ(τ, t, x)=
∫
Rn
Γ(t, x;T, y)h(τ, y)dy+
∫ T
t
∫
Rn
Γ(t, x; s, y)
[
〈 b(s, y,Θ(s, s, y),Θx(s, s, y)),Θx(τ, s, y) 〉
+g(τ, s, y,Θ(s, s, y),Θx(s, s, y),Θ(τ, s, y),Θx(τ, s, y))
]
dyds, (τ, t, x)∈D[0, T ]×Rn.
Finally, by the classical theory of PDE, and the regularity of the above expression, we get Θ(τ, t, x) is C2+α
in x, C1+
α
2 in t for some α ∈ (0, 1), and PDE (5.4) is satisfied.
In the previous section, we introduced Assumption (H3) to provide the convergence of ΘΠ(· , · , ·) in the
space C0,0,2(D[0, T ]× Rn), which guarantees the existences of an equilibrium strategy and a corresponding
equilibrium value function of Problem (N). However, as σ does not depend on u (see Condition (5.1)),
Assumption (H3) is reduced to the convergence in the space C0,0,1(D[0, T ]× Rn), i.e., (H3) is replaced by
the following:
(H3′). There exists a function Θ(· , · , ·) ∈ C0,0,1(D[0, T ]× Rn) such that
(5.22) lim
‖Π‖→0
(
|ΘΠ(τ, t, x) −Θ(τ, t, x)|+ |ΘΠx (τ, t, x) −Θx(τ, t, x)|
)
= 0, (τ, t, x) ∈ D[0, T ]× Rn,
uniformly for (τ, t, x) in any compact sets.
To make the study rigorously, we shall prove the expected convergence (5.22) holds true exactly for the
family ΘΠ(· , · , ·) constructed in the previous section. We still require all the involved functions are bound
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and continuously differentiable up to a needed order with bounded derivatives. Consequently, the uniform
Lipschitz continuous of τ 7→ (h(τ, x), hx(τ, x), g(τ, t, x, y, z, u)) follows from (H4) and (A). Therefore
|hΠ(τ, x)− h(τ, x)|+ |hΠx (τ, x) − hx(τ, x)|+ |g
Π(τ, t, x, u, y, z)− g(τ, t, x, u, y, z)| 6 K‖Π‖,
(τ, t, x, u, y, z) ∈ D[0, T ]× Rn × U × R× R1×d,
where gΠ and hΠ are defined by (4.49).
Proof of (5.22). Under Condition (5.1), (4.50) reads
(5.23)


ΘΠt (τ, t, x) + tr
[
a(t, x)ΘΠxx(τ, t, x)
]
+ 〈 b
(
t, x, ψ(ℓΠ(t), t, x,ΘΠ(t, t, x),ΘΠx (t, t, x))
)
, ΘΠx (τ, t, x) 〉
+gΠ
(
τ, t, x, ψ(ℓΠ(t), t, x,ΘΠ(t, t, x),ΘΠx (t, t, x)),Θ
Π(τ, t, x),ΘΠx (τ, t, x)
⊤σ(t, x)
)
= 0,
(τ, t, x) ∈ D[0, T ]× Rn,
ΘΠ(τ, T, x) = hΠ(τ, x), (τ, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.
By (5.6), we have
(5.24)
∆ΘΠ(τ, t, x) =
∫
Rn
Γ(t, x;T, y)∆hΠ(τ, y)dy +
∫ T
t
∫
Rn
Γ(t, x; s, y)
[
〈∆bΠ(s, y), ΘΠx (τ, s, y) 〉
+ 〈 b(s, y, ψ(s, s, y,Θ(s, s, y),Θx(s, s, y))), ∆Θ
Π
x (τ, s, y) 〉+∆g
Π(s, y)
]
dyds,
where we denote

∆ΘΠ(τ, s, y) = ΘΠ(τ, s, y)−Θ(τ, s, y),
∆hΠ(τ, y) = hΠ(τ, y)− h(τ, y),
∆bΠ(s, y) = b
(
s, y, ψ(ℓΠ(s), s, y,ΘΠ(s, s, y),ΘΠx (s, s, y))
)
− b
(
s, y, ψ(s, s, y,Θ(s, s, y),Θx(s, s, y))
)
,
∆gΠ(s, y) = gΠ(τ, s, y, ψ(ℓΠ(s), s, y,ΘΠ(s, s, y),ΘΠx (s, s, y)),Θ
Π(τ, s, y),ΘΠx (τ, s, y)
⊤σ(s, y))
−g(τ, s, y, ψ(s, s, y,Θ(s, s, y),Θx(s, s, y)),Θ(τ, s, y),Θx(τ, s, y)
⊤σ(s, y)).
Similarly,
(5.25)
∆ΘΠx (τ, t, x) =
∫
Rn
Γ(t, x;T, y)∆hΠy (τ, y)dy −
∫
Rn
Γ(t, x;T, y)ρ(t, x, T, y)∆hΠ(τ, y)dy
+
∫ T
t
∫
Rn
Γx(t, x; s, y)
[
〈∆bΠ(s, y), ΘΠx (τ, s, y) 〉
+ 〈 b
(
s, y, ψ(s, s, y,Θ(s, s, y),Θx(s, s, y))
)
, ∆ΘΠx (τ, s, y) 〉+∆g
Π(s, y)
]
dyds.
Therefore, from (5.24) and (5.25), one obtains
|∆ΘΠ(τ, t, x)| + |∆ΘΠx (τ, t, x)|
6
∫
Rn
Ke
−λ|x−y|
2
4(T−t)
(T − t)
n
2
· ‖Π‖dy +
∫
Rn
Ke
−λ|x−y|
2
4(T−t)
(T − t)
n
2
(
1 +
|x− y|2
4(T − t)
)
· ‖Π‖dy
+
∫ T
t
∫
Rn
Ke
−λ|x−y|
2
4(s−t)
(s− t)
n+1
2
[
‖Π‖+ |∆ΘΠ(s, s, y)|+ |∆ΘΠx (s, s, y)|+ |∆Θ
Π(τ, s, y)|+ |∆ΘΠx (τ, s, y)|
]
dyds
6 K‖Π‖+
∫ T
t
∫
Rn
Ke
−λ|x−y|
2
4(s−t)
(s− t)
n+1
2
[
|∆ΘΠ(s, s, y)|+ |∆ΘΠx (s, s, y)|+ |∆Θ
Π(τ, s, y)|+ |∆ΘΠx (τ, s, y)|
]
dyds.
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Then,
sup
τ∈[0,t]
(
|∆ΘΠ(τ, t, x)|+ |∆ΘΠx (τ, t, x)|
)
6 K‖Π‖
+
∫ T
t
∫
Rn
Ke
−λ|x−y|
2
4(s−t)
(s− t)
n+1
2
sup
τ∈[0,s]
(
|∆ΘΠ(τ, s, y)|+ |∆ΘΠx (τ, s, y)|
)
dyds.
Applying Gronwall’s inequality leads to
sup
τ∈[0,t]
(
|∆ΘΠ(τ, t, x)|+ |∆ΘΠx (τ, t, x)|
)
6 K‖Π‖, t ∈ [0, T ].
We have proved the expected convergence (5.22).
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